

# Notes From The **Red** Team: Why Perimeter Security Fails

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White h^t hacker & Security Researcher



# What we'll talk about

The Shift in APT Landscape

The New Perimeters

Why Firewalls/AV/EDR fail

Examples from our recent research

# Whoami Y1nTh35h3ll



Security researcher, White h^t hacker (Finance, Military/Gov)

Co-Founder @ CyberArt, Board Member @ Javelin Networks


~30 years experience – Programming, NetComm, IT/System

Ex-Technology Group Manager @ Microsoft (~8 years), coded  
Windows Server Tools

Ex-CTO @ public companies, M.A Law

Certified CISSP, VMWare, NetApp, EMC, Netware etc


# All you need is... Love?



**DANCE LIKE NOBODY'S WATCHING**



**HANDLE DATA LIKE EVERYBODY'S  
WATCHING**



C:\

PS ► cd

**ANY organization can be hacked.**







Full Bypass of  
AV / EDR / Logging / Auditing  
Using Invisi-Shell PoC



- > NetworkProvider
- > NetworkProvisioning
- > NlaSvc
- > Ntfs
- > NTLM
- > OfflineFiles
- > OneBackup
- > OneX
- > OOBE-Machine-DUI
- > OtpCredentialProvider
- > PackageStateRoaming
- > ParentalControls
- > Partition
- > PerceptionRuntime
- > PerceptionSensorDataServi
- > PersistentMemory-INvdimr
- > PersistentMemory-Nvdimn
- > PersistentMemory-Nvdimn
- > PersistentMemory-PmemD
- > PersistentMemory-ScmBus
- > PersistentMemory-VirtualN
- > Policy-based QoS
- ▼ PowerShell
  - Admin
  - Operational
- > PowerShell-DesiredStateCo
- > PrimaryNetworkIcon
- > PrintBRM
- > PrintService
- > PriResources-Deployment
- > Program-Compatibility-Ass
- > Provisioning-Diagnostics-F
- > Proximity-Common

**Operational** Number of events: 1,766

Level	Date and Time	Source	Event ID	Task Category
Warning	09/01/2019 12:06:44	PowerShell (Microsoft...	4104	Execute a Remote Co...
Warning	09/01/2019 12:06:44	PowerShell (Microsoft...	4104	Execute a Remote Co...
Warning	09/01/2019 12:06:44	PowerShell (Microsoft...	4104	Execute a Remote Co...
Warning	09/01/2019 12:06:44	PowerShell (Microsoft...	4104	Execute a Remote Co...
Warning	09/01/2019 12:06:44	PowerShell (Microsoft...	4104	Execute a Remote Co...
Warning	09/01/2019 12:06:44	PowerShell (Microsoft...	4104	Execute a Remote Co...
Warning	09/01/2019 12:06:44	PowerShell (Microsoft...	4104	Execute a Remote Co...
Information	09/01/2019 12:06:44	PowerShell (Microsoft...	40962	PowerShell Console St...
Information	09/01/2019 12:06:44	PowerShell (Microsoft...	53504	PowerShell Named Pin...

**Event 40962, PowerShell (Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell)**

General Details

PowerShell console is ready for user input


Log Name: Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational  
 Source: PowerShell (Microsoft-Windc  
 Event ID: 40962  
 Level: Information  
 User: SHKOOGI2\Yossi  
 OpCode: (2)  
 More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

Logged: 09/01/2019 12:06:44  
 Task Category: PowerShell Console Startup  
 Keywords: None  
 Computer: SHKOOGI2

- Actions**
- Operational
  - Open Saved Log...
  - Create Custom View...
  - Import Custom View...
  - Clear Log...
  - Filter Current Log...
  - Properties
  - Disable Log
  - Find...
  - Save All Events As...
  - Attach a Task To this Log...
  - View
  - Refresh
  - Help
  - Event 4104, PowerShell (Microsoft-Wi...
  - Event Properties
  - Attach Task To This Event...
  - Copy
  - Save Selected Events...
  - Refresh
  - Help



# C2 Scenario with No Direct Internet Allowed



# FWBypass: Crafted dropped packets C2

## By Dor Amit

- In-direct bypass with a set of C&C techniques
- Transfer payload by manipulating the data captured by different audit mechanisms
- Consume it later by accessing the log and reconstruct it using pre-defined logic
- <https://youtu.be/XkVSCATKzwU>

Client01 on PC01 - Virtual Machine Connection

File Action Media View Help

Recycle Bin

Computer Management

File Action View Help

Computer Management (Local)

- System Tools
  - Task Scheduler
    - Task Scheduler Library
      - Event Viewer Task Scheduler Library
        - Microsoft
          - Event Viewer
            - Custom Views
              - Windows Logs
                - Application
                  - Security
                  - Setup
                  - System
                  - Forwarded Events
                - Applications and Services Logs
                  - Subscriptions
                - Shared Folders
                - Local Users and Groups
                - Performance
                - Device Manager
                - Storage
                  - Disk Management
                  - Services and Applications

| Keywords     | Date and Time       | Source   | Event ID | Task Category |
|--------------|---------------------|----------|----------|---------------|
| Audit Suc... | 29/01/2019 13:13:06 | Eventlog | 1102     | Log clear     |

Event 1102, Eventlog

General Details

The audit log was cleared.

Subject: Security ID: DOM\user

Log Name: Security  
 Source: Eventlog  
 Event ID: 1102  
 Level: Information  
 User: N/A  
 OpCode: Info

Logged: 29/01/2019 13:13:06  
 Task Category: Log clear  
 Keywords: Audit Success  
 Computer: CLIENT01.dom.local

More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

Mac Address 0 00-15-5D-00-00-03  
**IP Address 0 10.10.10.12**  
 Network Adapter 1 Microsoft Hyper-V Network Adapter #4  
 Mac Address 1 00-15-5D-00-00-04  
**IP Address 1 172.30.254.254**  
 Fixed Disk 0 C: ( ) 26GB / 100GB (26% used)

DC01 on PC01 - Virtual Machine Connection

File Action Media View Help

Administrator: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe

```
C:\Scripts\StandAlone>fwbypass.exe encodefw sourcetext, "get-date | out-file c:\temp\Fwbypass-29-02-2019.txt -force"
" packetencmod,dotnet targetip,10.10.10.12 encoding:utf8 usecompression magicendpacket

C:\Scripts\StandAlone>fwbypass.exe encodefw sourcetext, "get-date | out-file c:\temp\Fwbypass-29-02-2019.txt -force"
" packetencmod,dotnet targetip,10.10.10.12 encoding:utf8 usecompression magicendpacket
```

Filter Hosts

Mac Address 2 02-00-4C-4F-4F-50  
**IP Address 2 189.254.105.16**  
 Fixed Disk 0 C: ( ) 13GB / 100GB (12% used)



How adversaries bypass your perimeter defenses


(H)Ac(k)tive Directory



# AD DATABASE IS EXPOSED BY DESIGN FROM EVERY ENDPOINT



# Active Directory Reconnaissance



Command Prompt



commands.txt - Note...



12:06 PM  
11/6/2018



**ONE DOES NOT SIMPLY**

**GENERATE MEANINGFUL ANALYSIS  
FROM MULTIPLE LOGS**

| Level       | Date and Time       | Source                   | Event ID |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------------------|----------|
| Warning     | 31/12/2018 08:49:56 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Warning     | 31/12/2018 08:49:53 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Warning     | 31/12/2018 08:49:53 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Warning     | 31/12/2018 08:49:53 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Information | 31/12/2018 08:49:53 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 53504    |
| Warning     | 31/12/2018 08:48:17 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Warning     | 31/12/2018 08:48:01 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Warning     | 31/12/2018 08:48:01 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Warning     | 31/12/2018 08:48:01 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Warning     | 31/12/2018 08:48:01 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |

Event 4104, PowerShell (Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell)

# Logs from Routine

```

Creating Scriptblock text (1 of 1):
{
    $script:ExpectingException = $true
    $events = get-winevent -path $TraceFile -Oldest -FilterXPath "[System[Provider[@Name='Microsoft-Diagnostics-Networking']] and (EventID=6100)]" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    $script:ExpectingException = $false
    foreach($event in $events)
  
```

Log Name: Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational  
 Source: PowerShell (Microsoft-Windc  
 Event ID: 4104 Task Category: Execute a Remote Command  
 Level: Warning Keywords: None  
 User: SHKOOGI2\Yossi Computer: SHKOOGI2  
 OpCode: On create calls  
 More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

| Level       | Date and Time       | Source                   | Event ID |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------------------|----------|
| Warning     | 21/12/2018 11:40:33 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Information | 21/12/2018 11:40:33 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 40962    |
| Information | 21/12/2018 11:40:33 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 53504    |
| Information | 21/12/2018 11:40:33 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 40961    |
| Warning     | 21/12/2018 11:34:10 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Warning     | 21/12/2018 11:34:10 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Warning     | 21/12/2018 11:34:10 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Warning     | 21/12/2018 11:34:10 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Warning     | 21/12/2018 11:34:10 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 4104     |
| Information | 21/12/2018 11:34:08 | PowerShell (Microsoft... | 53504    |

Event 4104, PowerShell (Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell)

# Logs from Breach

```

Creating Scriptblock text (3 of 4):
me: ' + $StartTime)
    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Green ('End time: ' + (Get-Date))
  }
}
-#
  
```

Log Name: Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational  
 Source: PowerShell (Microsoft-Windc  
 Event ID: 4104 Task Category: Execute a Remote Command  
 Level: Warning Keywords: None  
 User: SHKOOGI2\Yossi Computer: SHKOOGI2  
 OpCode: On create calls  
 More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

**Logging is *Not* Detecting**

**Detecting is *Not* Mitigating**

Active Directory Reconnaissance  
With Javelin 'ADProtect'  
(aka Threat Defense for AD)

objectca  
iscritic  
operatin  
uschang  
instance  
name  
msds-sup  
pwdlast  
servicep  
objectc  
samaccou  
lastlog  
uscreat  
objectgu  
localpo  
whencrea  
adspath  
useracco  
cn  
countryc  
primaryg  
whenchar  
operatin  
dnshost  
dscorepr  
distingu  
samaccou  
objects  
accounte

Select Wind  
Command Prompt

```
C:\Users\mike>net group "domain admins" /do_
```

w2k12-mssql-1, WS  
250 67 6 0 0}

PS C:\US



# **Symantec TDAD (Threat Defense for AD)**

<Previously Javelin ADProtect>

- No agent. No installations.
- Up to 10x scale for Perception Control.
- No fake stuff, not a honeypot - instead unique hooking with memory manipulation (Patented)
- Unique presence allows for Forensics and Containment opportunity.
- Ongoing Attack Simulations for Active Directory.

De-obfuscate any command~

with **Babel-Shellfish**

By Omer Yair

F:\Babel-Shellfish>

Babel-Shellfish

File Home Share View

< > > This PC > VOLUME2 (F:) > Babel-Shellfish

Search Babel-Shellfish

| Name                        | Date modified     | Type                  | Size   |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|--------|
| Logs                        | 10/5/2018 6:25 AM | File folder           |        |
| Babel-Shellfish.dll         | 10/4/2018 1:40 PM | Application extension | 14 KB  |
| ClrProfilerHooker.dll       | 10/4/2018 9:53 PM | Application extension | 144 KB |
| Install-Babel-Shellfish.bat | 10/5/2018 3:33 AM | Windows Batch File    | 2 KB   |

4 items

```

10
11 $w1Ali =
    $w1Ali.
    , 'on.' ,
    'led' , 'a
  
```

```

Au' , 's' , 'l'
, $true)
  
```

# Key Takeaways

*Motivation & time* are all it takes to hack ANY organization

Easy to get in

Easy to bypass perimeter defenses

Easy to do reconnaissance on identities & data assets

Perimeters are *trivially bypassed* by skilled adversaries.


Your SIEM can easily increase your Time To Resolve.

Physical Security & Meaningful Logging (with High-Fidelity Signals, Detection & Mitigation) probably last controls to get fair chance in unfair battle field.

**Do you have a question?**

# Links & THANKS!

My Git: <https://github.com/YossiSassi>



**Omer Yair**

<https://github.com/OmerYa>



**Dor Amit**

*The Gang :-)*



# Th^nk Yoo

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